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The Confrontation Clause, the Right Against
Self-Incrimination and the Supreme Court:
A Critique and Some Modest Proposals
David E. Seidelson*
I. INTRODUCTION
A criminal prosecution represents the most direct and abra-
sive conflict possible between the state and the individual.
Rhetoric aside,' it is the prosecution's goal to deny the defendant
his freedom. In those circumstances, the constitutional protec-
tions afforded the accused are of critical importance. Yet in re-
cent years the United States Supreme Court has significantly
circumscribed two basic protections: the sixth amendment right
of confrontation' and the fifth amendment right against self-
* Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1979):
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the 'usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special
duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and
therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmen-
tal powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2) during trial
the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may- make decisions
normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public in-
terest should be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the ac-
cused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts. With respect to
evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsibilities different from
those of a lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor should make timely
disclosure to the defense of available evidence, known to him, that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or
reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally
avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the
prosecutor's case or aid the accused.
See also MODEL- CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1979):
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation
shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defen-
dant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prose-
cutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
Id.
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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incrimination.'
II. THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
In Ohio v. Roberts," the defendant "was charged with forgery
of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs, and with possession of
stolen credit cards belonging to Isaacs and his wife Amy."5 Dur-
ing a preliminary hearing Isaacs' daughter, Anita, testified at the
behest of defense counsel that she was acquainted with the
defendant and that she assented to the defendant's use of her
apartment for a few-days while she was away. Lengthy question-
ing, however, failed to elicit an admission by Anita that she had
given the defendant checks and credit cards without informing
him that she did not have her parents' permission to use them.'
The defendant, Herschel Roberts, was indicted by a grand jury.
At the trial before a jury, Roberts testified that Anita gave
him the checks and credit cards with the understanding that he
was permitted to use them.' In rebuttal, the prosecutor offered
the transcript of Anita's preliminary hearing testimony. Defense
counsel objected that use of the transcript violated the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right of confrontation. After concluding
that Anita was unavailable as a witness, the trial court admitted
the transcript into evidence and the jury convicted Roberts on
all counts.' On appeal, the United States Supreme Court con-
3. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
5. 448 U.S. at 58.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 59.
8. Id. at 60.
[The Supreme Court of Ohio, by a 4-3 vote] held that the transcript was
inadmissible. Reasoning that normally there is little incentive to cross-
examine a witness at a preliminary hearing, where the "ultimate issue" is
only probably cause ... and citing the dissenting opinion in California v.
Green ... the court held that the mere opportunity to cross-examine at a
preliminary hearing did not afford constitutional confrontation for the pur-
poses of trial .... The court distinguished Green, where this Court had
ruled admissible the preliminary hearing testimony of a declarant who
was present at trial, but claimed forgetfulness. The Ohio court perceived
a "dictum" in Green that suggested that the mere opportunity to cross-
examine renders preliminary hearing testimony admissible .... But the
court concluded that Green "goes no further than to suggest that cross-
examination actually conducted at preliminary hearing may afford ade-
quate confrontation for purposes of a later trial." . . . Since Anita had not
[Vol. 20:429
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sidered the scope of the defendant's constitutional right to con-
front adverse witnesses. Sustaining the conviction,9 the Court
concluded that a defendant's right of confrontation is not
violated by the admission of inculpating hearsay where the
declarant is unavailable as a witness at trial, so long as the hear-
say declaration "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception"'"
or possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."1
Hearsay exceptions fall into one of two categories: those that
have been long-recognized ("firmly rooted") and those which are
fashioned ad hoc because of a determination of unique trust-
worthiness ("particularized guarantees of trustworthiness")."
Consequently, the language of the Court in Roberts goes a long
way toward making the sixth amendment confrontation right
simply congruent with the hearsay rule,'3 despite the Court's
stated recognition that "[t]he historical evidence leaves little
been cross-examined at the preliminary hearing and was absent at trial,
the introduction of the transcript of her testimony was held to have
violated [Roberts'] confrontation right.
Id. at 61-62.
9. Id. at 77.
10. Id. at 66.
11. Id. (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, was
gracious enough to cite to an earlier article of mine, Seidelson, Hearsay Excep-
tions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 76 (1971), along with
several other articles under the general heading of "scholarly commentary." 448
U.S. at 66 n.9. I wish to express my appreciation to Justice Blackmun for that
flattering designation.
12. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(5).
13. It is possible that the Court in future cases may give Roberts a restric-
tive reading, limiting its holding to those cases in which defense counsel had an
opportunity to examine the declarant at a preliminary hearing. Should that occur,
Roberts would go no further than to convert the dictum of Green, see infra
note 27, rationale (II), into decision. While that restrictive reading would be con-
siderably less destructive of the confrontation purpose than the broader
reading suggested by Roberts' language that those hearsay exceptions which
are "firmly rooted" or possess "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
are admissible against the accused, in my opinion, the Court intended the
broader reading dealt with in the text of this article. Apparently, the courts of
appeals have arrived at the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v.
Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981) (declarations of unavailable coconspirators
admissible against defendant as firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, irrespective
of any prior opportunity to examine declarants); United States v. Regilio, 669
F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982) (coconspirator's
declaration admissible against defendant as firmly rooted hearsay exception, ir-
respective of any prior opportunity to examine declarant); Lenza v. Wyrick, 665
F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981) (state of mind declarations admissible against defendant
as firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, irrespective of any prior opportunity to ex-
amine declarant). See infra the second paragraph of note 56.
1982]
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doubt . . . that the Clause was intended to exclude some hear-
say. 14 Even if we were to append to the Roberts rule the re-
quirement that the unavailability of the declarant not be at-
tributable to prosecutorial misconduct, the congruency would
subsist because statutory and judicial language has imposed a
similar requirement on those hearsay exceptions requiring
unavailability."5
14. 448 U.S. at 63.
The historical evidence leaves little doubt . . . that the [Confrontation]
Clause was intended to exclude some hearsay .... Moreover, underlying
policies support the same conclusion. The Court has emphasized that the
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial, and that "a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right
of cross-examination." . . . In short, the Clause envisions "a personal ex-
amination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has
an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the consci-
ence of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his deameanor upon
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S., at 242-243, 15 S. Ct.,
at 339.
Id. at 63-64. The Court's opinion in California v. Green, 339 U.S. 149 (1970),
touched on this point:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confronta-
tion Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a
different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Con-
frontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of
hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law.
Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have
more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the
statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay
exception. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965). The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is
admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to
the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.
Id. at 155-56.
15. "A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal,
claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or
wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying." FED. R. EVID. 804(a). "Of course if the
unavailability is by procurement of the party offering the hearsay statement,
the requirement ought not to be regarded as satisfied." C. MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 608-09 (2d ed. 1972).
We are of opinion that the admission in evidence of Taylor's
[preliminary hearing testimony] was in violation of the constitutional right
of the defendants to be confronted with the witnesses against them. It did
not appear that Taylor was absent from the trial by the suggestion, pro-
curement or act of the accused. On the contrary, his absence was
manifestly due to the negligence of the officers of the Government.
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900).
1982] Confrontation and Self-Incrimination 433
To the extent that Roberts deals explicitly with those hearsay
exceptions for which unavailability is a condition precedent, the
confrontation right may arguably provide more protection for
the defendant than does the hearsay rule, wherein some excep-
tions are operable irrespective of the declarant's availability. An
examination of pre-Roberts decisions, however, indicates that
many of the hearsay exceptions for which unavailability is not a
condition precedent have been deemed available even against the
criminal defendant. In fact, in those cases, it has been the
declarant's trial availability that has led to the conclusion that
the extrajudicial declarations are admissible against the
accused." Therefore, to a significant extent, Roberts tends to
reduce the confrontation clause to nothing more than a "constitu-
tional hearsay rule" subject to the many hearsay exceptions.
The reasons suggested in Roberts are hardly encouraging to
one who feels strongly about preserving those constitutional
rights specifically granted to a criminal defendant faced with a
possible deprivation of liberty. The Supreme Court, after assert-
ing that "competing interests . . . may warrant dispensing with
confrontation at trial,"'7 offers these competing considerations:
"Significantly, every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effec-
tive law enforcement, and in the development and precise for-
mulation of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal pro-
ceedings."' 8 One could conclude that a state's "strong interest in
effective law enforcement" is synonymous with the state's desire
to secure convictions in criminal prosecutions. If so, that interest
does indeed compete with the confrontation clause. The confron-
tation clause, however, like other constitutional protections
specifically applicable to the accused, was intended to prevail
over the state's interest in securing convictions. Indeed, such
constitutional guarantees were intended to make convictions
more difficult, as an appropriate price to pay for protecting the
16. "Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court
statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full
and effective cross-examination." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
"The Constitution as construed in Bruton . . . is violated only where the out-of-
court hearsay statement is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the trial for
'full and effective' cross-examination." Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627 (1971).
17. 448 U.S. at 64.
18. Id.
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rights of the individual defendant. Roberts suggests a different
and novel view: that a criminal defendant's constitutional rights
are not intended to prevail over the state's interest in securing
convictions, but rather are to be weighed against it. If the
Court's view prevails, each such constitutional "guarantee" must
presumably be balanced against the state's interest in securing a
successful prosecution, a balancing process that seems to subvert
the basic purpose of those guarantees preferring individual
rights over the state's interest in convictions.
As to the state's interest "in the development and precise for-
mulation of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal pro-
ceedings", the implication is that a state's interest in fashioning
and applying easily understood and relatively specific rules of
evidence is to be balanced against the sixth amendment's con-
frontation clause when determining the scope of the latter. That
is a rather shocking conclusion. Perhaps the clearest and most
specific rule of evidence a state could fashion would be one pro-
viding that all hearsay is to be admissible against the accused.
Should a state's interest in "the development and precise formu-
lation" of such a rule of evidence be given the capacity to
diminish the scope of the confrontation clause? One would think
not, for to reduce the extent of constitutional rights in such a
manner seems to work a perversion of the basic purpose of those
rights extended to the accused, and to place a premium on a
state's ability to fashion evidentiary rules diametrically opposed
to constitutional guarantees.
Of course in Roberts, the Ohio rule of evidence was not so
sweeping as the admittedly outrageous hypothetical rule posed
here. The Ohio statute "permit[ted] [among other things] the use
of preliminary examination testimony of a witness who 'cannot
for any reason be produced at the trial.' "19 Notwithstanding the
19. The Ohio statute reads:
Testimony taken at an examination or a preliminary hearing at which
the defendant is present, or at a former trial of the cause, or taken by
deposition at the instance of the defendant or the state, may be used
whenever the witness giving such testimony dies, or cannot for any
reason be produced at the trial, or whenever the witness has, since giving
such testimony, become incapacitated to testify. If such former testimony
is contained within a bill of exceptions, or authenticated transcript of such
testimony, it shall be proven by the bill of exceptions, or transcript, other-
wise by other testimony.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (Page 1975).
[Vol. 20:429
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more restrained nature of the rule, however, the Court's indica-
tion continues to be troubling in that the state's interest in
developing and precisely formulating such a rule is a competing
interest that may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial.
Neither a state's interest in successful prosecutions nor its in-
terest in developing and formulating rules of evidence, often aimed
at securing convictions, should be given the potential of restrict-
ing the sixth amendment's confrontation clause.
The balance of the Court's opinion in Roberts is devoted to
demonstrating the existence of "necessity"0 and "trustworthi-
ness ' 21 with regard to the extrajudicial declaration received
against the accused, as a means of justifying the Court's conclu-
sion that the defendant's confrontation right was not violated.
But the existence of necessity and trustworthiness more appro-
priately and traditionally demonstrates the propriety of fashion-
ing an exception to the hearsay rule. Even to one realizing that
constitutional rights are seldom absolutes and that they almost
inevitably are balanced against competing interests, balancing
the confrontation clause against the state's interest in securing
convictions still seems to overlook a basic decision made by the
Framers that the constitutional rights explicitly applicable to the
accused are intended to prevail over the state's interest in ob-
taining convictions.' Moreover, balancing the right of confronta-
tion against the state's interest in fashioning its own rules of
evidence hardly seems different from restricting the constitu-
tional right by recourse to a state's interest in securing convic-
tions as manifested by the state's rules of evidence.
One could understand a balancing process that asks to what
extent the basic rights that are protected by the confrontation
clause are preserved by a particular state's evidentiary rules, so
that, while the "absolute" right might be diluted, the underlying
values may be retained. One could even recognize how an ex-
amination of necessity and trustworthiness is related to such a
balancing test. But Roberts purports to go beyond this balancing
process. The Court's language indicates that what the hearsay
rule and its exceptions permit is not likely to violate the sixth
20. 448 U.S. at 65. See part IV of the Court's opinion, id. at 74.
21. 448 U.S. at 65. See part III of the Court's opinion, id. at 67.
22. The confrontation clause, see supra note 2, makes no reference to a
state's securing convictions.
1982]
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amendment. That leaves little, if any, of the confrontation clause
intact.
It must be conceded that Roberts was neither a wholly unex-
pected nor a totally radical departure from the Court's recent
view of the scope of protection afforded by the confrontation
clause. Indeed, it could be asserted that the near congruency be-
tween the hearsay rule and its exceptions and the confrontation
clause achieved by Roberts was the logical, if not inexorable,
conclusion suggested by the Court's sixth amendment decisions
of the past dozen years. That line of cases so significantly limited
and distinguished away the confrontation rights found to exist
from 1965 to 1968, that there may have remained only two alter-
natives: (1) repudiate the more recent decisions and revert to the
broader rights recognized until 1968, or (2) negate the confronta-
tion clause by equating it with the hearsay rule and its excep-
tions.
From 1965 to 1968, the Court held that the accused's confron-
tation rights were violated when he was subjected to incrimina-
tion by (1) the preliminary hearing testimony of a declarant not
available for cross-examination at trial, Pointer v. Texas23 and
Barber v. Page; (2) a purported declaration of a third party who
23. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). At Pointer's preliminary hearing in Texas, one
Phillips, the victim of a robbery, identified Pointer as the man who had robbed
Phillips at gunpoint. Id. at 401. Pointer was not represented by counsel at the
preliminary hearing. "Some time before the trial was held, Phillips moved to
California. After putting in evidence to show that Phillips had moved and did
not intend to return to Texas, the State at the trial offered the transcript of
Phillips' testimony given at the preliminary hearing as evidence against
[Pointer]." Id. at 401. In spite of defendant's confrontation objection, the
preliminary hearing testimony was received and defendant was convicted. The
Court, after concluding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation was ap-
plicable to state criminal proceedings, reversed.
24. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
[Barber] and one Woods were jointly charged with [armed] robbery, and
at the preliminary hearing were represented by the same retained
counsel, a Mr. Parks. During the course of the hearing, Woods agreed to
waive his privilege against self-incrimination. Parks then withdrew as
Woods' attorney but continued to represent [Barber]. Thereupon Woods
proceeded to give testimony that incriminated [Barber]. Parks did not
cross-examine Woods, although an attorney for another codefendant did.
By the time [Barber] was brought to trial some seven months later,
Woods was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary in Texarkana, Texas,
about 225 miles from the trial court in Oklahoma. The State proposed to
introduce against [Barber] the transcript of Woods' testimony at the
preliminary hearing on the ground that Woods was unavailable to testify
[Vol. 20:429
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refused to testify at trial, Douglas v. Alabama; 5 and (3) the ad-
because he was outside the jurisdiction. [Barber] objected to that course
on the ground that it would deprive him of his right to be confronted with
the witnesses against him. His objection was overruled and the transcript
was admitted and read to the jury, which found him guilty.
Id. at 720. The Court concluded that Barber's confrontation right had been
violated and ordered the habeas corpus relief sought. In doing so, the Court
noted that state authorities failed to make use of alternative means of securing
Woods' presence at trial:
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), [which] gives federal courts the power to issue writs
of habeas corpus ad testificandum at the request of state prosecutorial
authorities, [or] the policy of the United States Bureau of Prisons to per-
mit federal prisoners to testify in state court criminal proceedings pur-
suant to writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued out of state
courts.
Id. at 724. The Court also noted that the same result would have been reached:
on the facts of this case had [Barber's] counsel actually cross-examined
Woods at the preliminary hearing. . . . The right to confrontation is
basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine
and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A
preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into
the merits of the case than a trial, simply because its function is the more
limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the ac-
cused for trial.
Id. at 725.
25. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
[Douglas] and one Loyd were tried separately in Alabama's Circuit
Court on charges of assault with intent to murder. Loyd was tried first
and was found guilty. The State then called Loyd as a witness at
[Douglas'] trial. Because Loyd planned to appeal his conviction, his lawyer,
who also represented [Douglas], advised Loyd to rely on the privilege
against self-incrimination and not to answer any questions. When Loyd
was sworn, the lawyer objected, on self-incrimination grounds, "to this
witness appearing on the stand," but the objection was overruled. Loyd
gave his name and address but, invoking the privilege, refused to answer
any questions concerning the alleged crime. The trial judge ruled that
Loyd could not rely on the privilege because of his conviction, and
ordered him to answer, but Loyd persisted in his refusal. The judge
thereupon granted the State Solicitor's motion "to declare [Loyd] a hostile
witness and give me the privilege of cross-examination." The Solicitor
then produced a document said to be a confession signed by Loyd. Under
the guise of cross-examination to refresh Loyd's recollection, the Solicitor
purported to read from the document, pausing after every few sentences
to ask Loyd, in the presence of the jury, "Did you make that statement?"
Each time, Loyd asserted the privilege and refused to answer, but the
Solicitor continued this form of questioning until the entire document had
been read. The Solicitor then called three law enforcement officers who
identified the document as embodying a confession made and signed by
Loyd.
The statements from the document as read by the Solicitor recited in con-
1982]
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mission of a co-defendant who did not testify at trial, Bruton v.
United States.'6
From 1970 through the Roberts decision, the Court has held that
the accused's confrontation rights were not violated when he was
subjected to incrimination by (1) the preliminary hearing testimony
of a declarant not available at trial, California v. Green' and Ohio
siderable detail the circumstances leading to and surrounding the alleged
crime; of crucial importance, they named [Douglas] as the person who
fired the shotgun blast which wounded the victum. The jury found
[Douglas] guilty.
Id. at 416-17 (footnotes omitted). The Court reversed, concluding that Douglas'
"inability to cross-examine Loyd as to the alleged confession plainly denied him
the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 419.
In addition, the Court noted that:
Loyd could not be cross-examined on a statement imputed to but not ad-
mitted by him. Nor was the opportunity to cross-examine the law enforce-
ment officers adequate to redress this denial of the essential right secured
by the Confrontation Clause. Indeed, their testimony enhanced the danger
that the jury would treat the Solicitor's questioning of Loyd and Loyd's
refusal to answer as proving the truth of Loyd's alleged confession.
Id. at 419-20.
26. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
A joint trial of [Bruton] and one Evans . . . resulted in the conviction of
both by a jury on a federal charge of armed postal robbery .... A postal
inspector testified that Evans orally confessed to him that Evans and
[Bruton] committed the armed robbery.... [Tihe [Eighth Circuit], relying
upon Delli Paoli, [352 U.S. 232 (1957)], affirmed [Bruton's] conviction
because the trial judge instructed the jury that although Evans' confes-
sion was competent evidence against Evans it was inadmissible hearsay
against [Bruton] and therefore had to be disregarded in determining
[Bruton's] guilt or innocence.
Id. at 124-25. The Court reversed, concluding that:
there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or can-
not, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital
to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored. . . . Such a context is presented here, where
the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant,
who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately
spread before the jury in a joint trial. . . . The unreliability of such
evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here,
does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was against
such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed.
Id. at 135-36.
27. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Melvin Porter, a 16-year-old minor, was arrested for selling marihuana to
an undercover police officer. Four days after his arrest, while in the
custody of juvenile authorities, Porter named ... Green as his supplier....
Porter claimed that Green had called him . . . . asked him to sell some
"stuff' or "grass," and had that same afternoon personally delivered a
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v. Roberts,28 (2) a purported declaration of a third party who was
shopping bag containing 29 "baggies" of marihuana .... A week later,
Porter testified at [Green's] preliminary hearing. He again named [Green]
as his supplier, although he now claimed that instead of personally
delivering the marihuana, [Green] had showed him where to pick up the
shopping bag, hidden in the bushes at Green's parents' house. Porter's
story at the preliminary hearing was subjected to extensive cross-
examination by [Green's] counsel-the same counsel who represented
[Green] at his subsequent trial. At the conclusion of the hearing, [Green]
was charged with furnishing marihuana to a minor in violation of Califor-
nia law.
[Green's] trial took place some two months later before a court sitting
without a jury. The State's chief witness was again young Porter. But this
time Porter ... proved to be "markedly evasive and uncooperative on the
stand." . . . He testified that [Green] had called him . . . and asked him to
sell some unidentified "stuff." He admitted obtaining shortly thereafter 29
plastic "baggies" of marihuana, some of which he sold. But when pressed
as to whether [Green] had been his supplier, Porter claimed that he was
uncertain how he obtained the marihuana, primarily because he was at
the time on "acid" (LSD), which he had taken 20 minutes before [Green]
phoned. Porter claimed that he was unable to remember the events that
followed the phone call, and that the drugs he had taken prevented his
distinguishing fact from fantasy.
Id. at 151-52. Ultimately, portions of Porter's preliminary hearing testimony
were received in evidence and [Green] was convicted.
The Court, reversing the California Supreme Court, concluded that the
receipt in evidence of Porter's preliminary hearing testimony had not violated
Green's right of confrontation. The Court offered two rationales for its conclu-
sion: (1) "[W]e note that none of our decisions interpreting the Confrontation
Clause requires excluding the out-of-court statements of a witness who is
available and testifying at trial," id. at 161; and (2):
We also think that Porter's preliminary hearing testimony was admissible
as far as the Constitution is concerned wholly apart from the question of
whether [Green] had an effective opportunity for confrontation at the
subsequent trial. For Porter's statement at the preliminary hearing had
already been given under circumstances closely approximating those that
surround the typical trial. Porter was under oath; [Green] was
represented by counsel-the same counsel in fact who later represented
him at the trial; [Green] had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter as
to his statement; and the proceedings were conducted before a judicial
tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of the hearings. Under
these circumstances, Porter's statement would, we think, have been ad-
missible at trial even in Porter's absence if Porter had been actually
unavailable, despite good-faith efforts of the State to produce him.
Id. at 165.
28. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The facts of Roberts are set forth supra in the text
accompanying notes 4-11. The opinion in Roberts converted from possible dic-
tum to formal decision that portion of Green which discussed the admissibility
of Porter's preliminary hearing testimony had Porter been unavailable at trial.
"These factors [surrounding Porter's preliminary hearing testimony] provided
all that the Sixth Amendment demands .... " Id. at 69.
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never called to testify by the prosecution, Dutton v. Evans,' (3)
the admission of a co-defendant who testified at trial and denied
having made the declaration, Nelson v. O'Neil,0 (4) the former
trial testimony of a star witness not available at the second trial,
29. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
Early on an April morning in 1964, three police officers were brutally
murdered in Gwinnett County, Georgia. . .. After many months of in-
vestigation, Georgia authorities charged . . . Evans and two other men,
Wade Truett and Venson Williams, with the officers' murders. Evans and
Williams were indicted by a grand jury; Truett was granted immunity
from prosecution in return for his testimony.
Evans pleaded not guilty and exercised his right under Georgia law to
be tried separately.
Id. at 76.
In addition to Truett, 19 other witnesses testified for the prosecution.
Defense counsel was given full opportunity to cross-examine each witness,
and he exercised that opportunity with respect to most of them.
One of the 20 prosecution witnesses was a man named Shaw. He
testified that he and Williams had been fellow prisoners in the federal
penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, at the time Williams was brought to
Gwinnett County to be arraigned on the charges of murdering the police
officers. Shaw said that when Williams was returned to the penitentiary
from the arraignment, he had asked Williams: "How did you make out in
Court?" and that Williams had responded, "If it hadn't been for that dirty
son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." Defense counsel
objected to the introduction of this testimony upon the ground that it was
hearsay and thus violative of Evans' right of confrontation. After the ob-
jection was overruled, counsel cross-examined Shaw at length.
Id. at 77-78 (footnote omitted).
[Evans] was convicted of murder and sentended to death. The judgment of
conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and this Court
denied certiorari. Evans then brought the present habeas corpus pro-
ceeding in a federal district court, alleging . . . that he had been denied
the constitutional right of confrontation at his trial. The District Court
denied the writ, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding that Georgia had, indeed, denied Evans the right, guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, "to be confronted by the
witnesses against him."
Id. at 76 (footnotes omitted). By plurality opinion, the Court reversed, finding
no violation of Evans' right of confrontation.
30. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
Arraigned on charges of kidnapping, robbery, and vehicle theft, both ...
[O'Neil] and Runnels pleaded not guilty, and at their joint trial they of-
fered an alibi defense.
[A] police officer testified that after the arrest Runnels had made an
unsworn oral statement admitting the crimes and implicating [O'Neil] as
his confederate. The trial judge ruled the officer's testimony as to the
substance of the alleged statement admissible against Runnels, but in-
structed the jury that it could not consider it against [O'Neil]. When Run-
nels took the stand in his own defense, he was asked on direct examina-
tion whether he had made the statement, and he flatly denied having
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Mancusi v. Stubbs,3' (5) the interlocking admissions of co-
defendants who did not testify at trial, Parker v. Randolph,32 and
done so. He also vigorously asserted that the substance of the statement
imputed to him was false. He was then intensively cross-examined by the
prosecutor, but stuck to his story in every particular. [O'Neil's] counsel
did not cross-examine Runnels, although he was, of course, fully free to do
so....
The jury found both defendants guilty as charged. After unsuccessful
efforts to set aside the conviction in the California courts, [O'Neill applied
for federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, and while the case was pending there this
Court decided Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, and Roberts v.
Russell, 392 U.S. 293, holding that under certain circumstances the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth, is violated when a codefendant's confession im-
plicating the defendant is placed before the jury at their joint trial. The
District Court ruled that [O'Neil's] conviction had to be set aside under
Bruton and Roberts, and the Court of Appelas for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed. 422 F. 2d 319 (1970).
Id. at 623-25 (footnotes omitted). The Court reversed, finding no violation of
O'Neil's confrontation right.
31. 408 U.S. 204 (1972). The defendant, Stubbs, was convicted of a felony in
a New York State Court and sentenced as a second offender because of a prior
Tennessee murder conviction in 1964. Id at 205. In 1954 he was convicted of
first-degree murder, assault with intent to murder, and two counts of kidnap-
ping. Id. at 207.
Nine years after his state court trial for murder, Stubbs sought release on
federal habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Tennessee.
He successfully urged upon that court that he had been denied the ef-
fective assistance of counsel in this 1954 trial because counsel had been
appointed for him only four days before the trial took place.... The State
of Tennessee then elected to retry him, and did so in 1964. By that time
Holm, [a victim of the alleged kidnapping and assault], who had been born
in Sweden but had become a naturalized American citizen, had returned
to Sweden and taken up permanent residence there .... Over appropriate
objection on constitutional grounds, the Tennessee trial judge then per-
mitted Holm's testimony at the earlier trial to be read to the jury. Stubbs
• . . was again convicted. This conviction was in due course affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
[Stubbs] has challenged the present second-offender sentence that was
imposed upon him by the New York Courts on the ground that his 1964
conviction upon retrial was constitutionally infirm because he was denied
his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to confront the witness Holm.
The Court of Appeals sustained this contention, relying on this Court's
opinion in Barber v. Page, 290 U.S. 719 (1968).
Id. at 209. The Supreme Court reversed.
32. 442 U.S. 62 (1979). In Randolph, the respondents, Randolph, Pickens,
and Hamilton, were convicted of murder durder during the commission of a rob-
bery and were sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 64. For its case, the' State
rested primarily on their oral confessions, which the trial court found to have
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(6) any extrajudicial declaration of a declarant unavailable at trial
if the declaration "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception"
or possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," Ohio
v. Roberts.3
In Green, the Court found admissible the preliminary hearing
testimony of a witness who was present at trial but, contrary to
his earlier testimony, claimed to be unable to recall certain
pertinent facts. 4 Part II of the Court's opinion distinguished the
earlier cases of Pointer and Barber on the ground that in Green
the witness whose preliminary hearing testimony was admitted
against the defendant was available at trial." Part III of the opin-
ion, however, asserts that the preliminary hearing testimony
would have been equally admissible had the witness been
unavailable at trial, because the earlier testimony had been
given under oath, subject to cross-examination, and "before a
judicial tribunal."3 Part III of the opinion does seem consistent
with the Court's statement in Pointer that "[tihe case before [the
been given freely and voluntarily, and which were admitted into evidence
through several police officers' testimony. Id. at 66. None of the three took the
stand. Id. at 66.
The jury was instructed that the confession of any one of the defendant's
could be used only against him, and that it could not be used as evidence of the
guilt of any of the codefendants. Id. at 67. The Tennessee Supreme Court
however found that the interlocking confessions of the three clearly
demonstrated the involvement of each, and held that the Bruton rule was not
violated where confessions are similar in nature. Id. at 68. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, after granting the
respondents' writs of habeas corpus, found that the respondents' rights under
Bruton had been violated. Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; but the Supreme
Court, by plurality opinion, reversed, finding that Bruton had not been violated.
33. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The facts of Roberts are set forth supra in the text
accompanying notes 4-11.
34. See supra note 27.
35. 399 U.S. at 162. The Court stated:
In Pointer ... for example, the State introduced at defendant's trial the
transcript of a crucial witness' testimony from a prior preliminary hear-
ing. The witness himself ... had left the jurisdiction and did not appear
at trial .... Similarly, in Barber ... the State introduced the preliminary
hearing testimony of an absent witness . . . under an "unavailability" ex-
ception to its hearsay rules.
[But] where the declarant is not absent, but is present to testify and to
submit to cross-examination, our cases, if anything, support the conclusion
that the admission of his out-of-court statements does not create a con-
frontation problem.
Id.
36. 399 U.S. at 165. The Court's opinion included:
We also think that Porter's preliminary hearing testimony was admissi-
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Court] would be quite a different one had [the declarant's] state-
ment been taken at a full-fledged hearing at which [the defen-
dant] had been represented by counsel who had been given a
complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine."37 In
Barber, however, the Court noted that the unconstitutionality of
receiving preliminary hearing testimony against the defendant
would subsist even "assum[ing] that [the defendant had] made a
valid waiver of his right to cross-examine [the declarant] at the
preliminary hearing, ... " In addition, the Court in Barber
asserted:
Moreover, we would reach the same result on the facts of this
case had [the defendant's] counsel actually cross-examined [the
declarant] at the preliminary hearing.... The right to confronta-
tion is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to
cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the de-
meanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much
less searching exploration into the merits of the case than a trial,
simply because its function is the more limited one of determining
whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While
there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity
for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing
satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the
witness is shown to be actually unavailable, this is not... such a
case.
39
Part III of Green squares only conditionally with the last sent-
ence of the excerpt from Barber and not at all with the re-
mainder.
The plurality opinion in Evans, where a purported declaration
of a third party never called to testify was deemed admissible, °
distinguished that case from Pointer, Barber, Douglas, and
Bruton in the following manner:
ble as far as the Constitution is concerned wholly apart from the question
of whether respondent had an effective opportunity for confrontation at
the subsequent trial. For Porter's statement at the preliminary hearing
had already been given under circumstances closely approximating those
that surround the typical trial. Porter was under oath; respondent was
represented by counsel-the same counsel in fact who later represented
him at the trial; respondent had every opportunity to cross-examine
Porter as to his statement; and the proceedings were conducted before a
judicial tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of the hearings.
Id.
37. 380 U.S. at 400.
38. 390 U.S. at 722.
39. Id. at 725-26.
40. See supra note 29.
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This cases does not involve evidence in any sense "crucial" or
"devastating," as did all the cases just discussed. It does not in-
volve the use, or misuse, of a confession made in the coercive at-
mosphere of official interrogation, as did Douglas . . . [and]
Bruton. . . . It does not involve any suggestion of prosecutorial
misconduct or even negligence, as did Pointer, Douglas, and
Barber. It does not involve the use by the prosecution of a paper
transcript, as did Pointer . . . and Barber. It does not involve a
joint trial, as did Bruton. 41
In an earlier article I pointed out that the common element
among the four earlier decisions was the absence of an oppor-
tunity for the accused to confront and cross-examine his accuser,
a problem which persists in Evans.42 As my discussion revealed,43
41. 400 U.S. at 87.
42. Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 76, 85 (1971).
43. Yet, [in Evans] perhaps the most accurate indicator of the degree of
cruciality or devastation inherent in [the challenged] testimony is the fact
that the prosecution saw fit to introduce it. It seems unlikely that the
state did not recognize the real potential of a sixth amendment violation
in [the] testimony. Moreover, not even Justice Stewart was willing to
label use of the testimony "harmless error," assuming, hypothetically,
that it was error at all. Only Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief
Justice Burger, considered [the] testimony to lack that degree of cruciality.
Certainly, the misuse "of a confession made in a coercive atmosphere of
official interrogation," was not a critical factor in Bruton. Indeed, had the
Court been offended seriously by any impropriety in the custodial inter-
rogation, it could have reversed Bruton's conviction .... The essence of
Bruton was that the words of [the codefendant] served to inculpate
Bruton who never had an opportunity to confront the declarant. Similarly,
in Douglas, it was not the prosecution's disingenuous method of apprising
the jury of [the accomplice's] confession which resulted in reversal.
Rather, the Court's opinion, complemented by the Bruton ruling, dictates
that reversal would have been required even if [the accomplice's] confes-
sion had been offered and received in evidence, because Douglas had no
opportunity to confront and cross-examine [the accomplice]. Moreover,
"[m]isconduct or even negligence" may have characterized the failure of
the prosecution to make the declarants available in Pointer and Barber,
but certainly no more so than the similar failure to summon [the
declarant] to the stand in Evans.
Likewise, use by the prosecution of a paper transcript in Pointer and
Barber would be a significant distinction only if the same declarations
could have been testified to by a witness other than the declarant.
Douglas demonstrates that such is not the case. Not even the presence of
three police officers, all of whom allegedly heard the declaration, was
deemed by the Court to be a constitutionally permissible substitute for
the presence and susceptibility to confrontation of the declarant. Nor
could a joint trial have been the critical sixth amendment factor in
[Vol. 20:429
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the above distinctions fail to explain satisfactorily the Court's
divergence from the former rationale.
In O'Neil, the Court admitted testimony about a prior confes-
sion of a co-defendant who testified at trial and denied having
made the declaration." The Court distinguished the case from
Bruton on the ground that the co-defendant in O'Neil ultimately
took the stand, whereas in Bruton the co-defendant-delarant
elected not to testify: "The Constitution as construed in Bruton,
in other words, is violated only where the out-of-court hearsay
statement is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the trial
for 'full and effective' cross-examination."" The Court concluded
that, despite the co-defendant's denial in O'Neil that he had
made the statement and his assertion that the statement was
false, there had been an opportunity for the defendant to subject
the co-defendant to "full and effective" cross-examination
concerning the alleged statement. Indeed, the Court said that the
co-defendant's denial of having made the statement was the best
possible response the defendant could have achieved."'
Bruton. Pointer, Douglas and Barber did not involve joint trials of co-
defendants, yet in each, the inculpating statement of a declarant, not
susceptible to confrontation and cross-examination, was found to have
violated the defendant's sixth amendment right.
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion eliminates two additional
"distinguishing" characteristics of Evans. First, the plurality had concluded
that the circumstances were such that cross-examination of [the declarant]
would have been feckless. but the dissent aptly noted that "[a] trial
lawyer might well doubt, as an article of the skeptical faith of that profes-
sion, such a categorical prophecy about the likely results of careful cross-
examination." Secondly, receipt of [the challenged] testimony [in Evans]
was predicated upon a long recognized state rule of evidence. One could
proffer like justifications supporting the trial judges in Pointer, Bruton,
and Barber for relying upon recognized rules of evidence, either state or
federal, in admitting evidence which ultimately proved violative of defen-
dants' sixth amendment right of confrontation. Indeed, in Bruton, the trial
judge presumably was relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Deli
Paoli [352 U.S. 232 (1957),] when he admitted [the codefendant's] confes-
sion, and instructed the jury to disregard it in determining the guilt or in-
nocence of Bruton. No rule of evidence, moreover, whether legislatively or
judicially fashioned, may prevail if it proves inconsistent with a right
assured by the Constitution ....
Seidelson, supra note 42, at 85-87 (footnotes omitted).
44. See supra note 30.
45. 402 U.S. at 627.
46. 402 U.S. at 628-29.
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But if the constitutional distinction between Bruton and O'Neil
is the fact that the declarant-co-defendant took the stand in
O'Neil, it is a distinction that did not exist when the prosecution
offered the alleged statement into evidence. At that time, the de-
clarant-co-defendant had not yet taken the stand and the prose-
cution could not have known with certainty whether he ulti-
mately would. Consequently, the prosecution's decision to offer
the statement in its case-in-chief, and the co-defendant's subse-
quent decision to take the stand in his own defense, combined to
deny the defendant the protection of Bruton.
But the trial in O'Neil occurred before Bruton was decided.
Surely in subsequent trials the prosecution, cognizant of Bruton
and sensitive to an obligation not to violate that constitutional
decision, will withhold the alleged statement of the co-defendant
until he actually takes the stand. Assuming that, after the co-
defendant has testified in an exculpating manner inconsistent
with the alleged statement, the prosecution will then use the
statement in cross-examining him to impeach his credibility and,
in most jurisdictions, as substantive evidence of his guilt.
Now it's the defendant's turn to engage in the "full and effec-
tive" cross-examination of the co-defendant contemplated by
O'Neil. How is defendant's counsel to accomplish this? If he
simply affords the co-defendant another opportunity to deny hav-
ing made the statement, as he presumably did under the prose-
cution's cross-examination, and to repeat his exculpating direct
testimony, as he may well have done under the prosecution's
cross-examination, defendant's counsel is likely to emphasize to
the jury that (a) the co-defendant's credibility is significantly
related to the defendant's guilt or innocence and (b) the co-
defendant's guilt or innocence is significantly related to the
defendant's guilt or innocence. Such "full and effective" cross-
examination seems calculated to exacerbate the very problem
that Bruton was intended to meet: the jury's incapacity to com-
ply with an instruction to disregard the co-defendant's alleged
statement inculpating both himself and the defendant when
deciding the guilt or innocence of the latter. 7
Going one step further, the police officer to whom the co-
47. Indeed, concern over the destructive nature of cross-examination in
such a situation may well explain why "[O'Neil's] counsel did not cross-examine
Runnels, although he was, of course, fully free to do so." 402 U.S. at 624.
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defendant allegedly made the statement will presumably be called
to the stand in the prosecution's rebuttal case to testify to the
statement and to the circumstances in which it was uttered.
Ultimately, the defendant will have the opportunity to cross-
examine the officer. That cross-examination, however, seems cer-
tain to emphasize further to the jury the intimate relationships
apparently perceived by the defendant's counsel between both (a)
the credibility conflict between the co-defendant and the officer
and how it relates to the defendant's guilt or innocence and,
ultimately, (b) the co-defendant's guilt or innocence and how that
relates to the guilt or innocence of defendant. Again, the evil in-
tended to be overcome by Bruton will be thrust into the jury
box.
The mandate of Bruton was clear and protective of the defen-
dant's confrontation right: the prosecution could not, by the sim-
ple expedient of trying two defendants jointly, have one defen-
dant's extrajudicial declaration, which incriminates them both,
heard by a jury that is required to resolve the guilt or innocence
of the nondeclarant defendant."8 O'Neil violates that mandate and
justifies the result by inviting the defendant's counsel to engage
in a form of cross-examination calculated to enhance the jury's
predictable psychological reaction that a co-defendant's declara-
tion evidences the defendant's guilt.
In Stubbs, the Court found admissible the former trial testi-
mony of a star witness who was not available at the second
trial, 9 distinguishing Barber on two grounds. First, the missing
witness, whose first-trial testimony was read to the jury in the
second trial, was in Sweden at the time of the second trial and,
therefore, legally unavailable to the prosecution.50 Second, be-
cause the prior testimony read to the second jury had been of-
fered at the first trial, there had been a more meaningful oppor-
tunity for defense counsel to conduct an effective cross-examina-
48. See 391 U.S. at 137.
49. See supra note 31.
50. Upon discovering that Holm resided in a foreign nation, the State of
Tennessee, so far as this record shows, was powerless to compel his attend-
ance at the second trial, either through its own process or through
established procedures depending on the voluntary assistance of another
government. . . . We therefore hold that the predicate of unavailability
was sufficiently stronger here than in Barber . . ..
408 U.S. at 212.
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tion than had existed in Barber, where the prior testimony had
been offered at a preliminary hearing only.5' Of course, the
Court's distinctions do not satisfy another element of Barber,
that "[t]he right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It in-
cludes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion
for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness." 2 Obviously,
the second jury which convicted the defendant had no opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the absent witness. Hence, the con-
frontation right in O'Neil lost that important aspect of "a trial
right."
The plurality in Randolph found independent confessions by
three defendants tried jointly to be admissible," holding that
Bruton had not been violated because each of the defendants in
Randolph had confessed and the confession of each was "inter-
locking"54 with the confessions of the others. None of the defen-
dants in the case took the stand:
When, as in Bruton, the confessing codefendant has chosen not to
take the stand and the implicated defendant has made no extra-
judicial admission of guilt, limiting instructions cannot be ac-
cepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause. Under such circumstances the "practical
and human limitations of the jury system" . . . override the theo-
retically sound premise that a jury will follow the trial court's in-
structions. But when a defendant's own confession is properly be-
fore the jury, we believe that the constitutional scales tip the
other way. The possible prejudice resulting from the failure of
the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not so "devastat-
ing" or "vital" to the confessing defendant to require departure
from the general rule allowing admission of evidence with
limiting instructions.55
51. The circumstances surrounding the giving of Alex Holm's testimony
at the 1954 trial were significantly more conducive to an assurance of
reliability than were those obtaining in Barber .... The 1954 Tennessee
proceeding was a trial of a serious felony on the merits, conducted in a
court of record before a jury, rather than before a magistrate. Stubbs was
represented by counsel who could and did effectively cross-examine prose-
cution witnesses.
408 U.S. at 213-14.
52. 390 U.S. at 725.
53. See supra note 32.
54. 442 U.S. at 75.
55. 442 U.S. at 74-75.
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The Court's language can be interpreted in two ways, both of
which are unacceptable. First, the language can be read as say-
ing that a jury that hears the extrajudicial interlocking confes-
sions of three defendants, none of whom takes the stand, will be
better able to disregard the confessions of two in determining
the guilt or innocence of the third than would a jury be able to
disregard the extrajudicial declaration of a co-defendant in
deciding the guilt or innocence of the nonconfessing defendant.
But that is contrary to human nature, for it is more likely that a
jury, having heard the interlocking confessions of D, D2, and D3,
would find it nearly impossible to disregard the confessions of D
and D2 in determining the guilt or innocence of D3. The very
fact that the confessions are interlocking seems to enhance the
jury's difficulty in disregarding two of the three confessions.
Consequently, the first reading of the plurality's rationale is not
persuasive.
The other possible reading of that language is even more
disturbing. One could read the sentence, "But when the defen-
dant's own confession is properly before the jury, we believe
that the constitutional scales tip the other way," as implying that
the confessing defendant is probably guilty anyway, and
therefore not entitled to the protection of Bruton. Indeed, one
could infer such a conclusion from the immediately succeeding
language: "The possible prejudice resulting from the failure of
the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not so
'devastating' or 'vital' to the confessing defendant to require
departure from the general rule allowing admission of evidence
with limiting instructions." The second reading implies that
somehow the confessing defendant loses the presumption of in-
nocence and with it the right to confront and cross-examine
those whose extrajudicial declarations may factually incriminate
him because of the prosecution's decision to try the defendants
jointly. Neither reading of the plurality's rationale is acceptable.
What is understandable is that, given the decisions in Green,
Evans, O'Neil, Stubbs, and Randolph, the Court should conclude
in Roberts that generally what the hearsay rule and its excep-
tions permit will not violate the confrontation clause. After all, in
those five earlier opinions the Court left intact so little of the
confrontation clause that, by the time Roberts was decided,
equating the clause with the hearsay rule and its exceptions was
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very nearly the only alternative to repudiating the five earlier
opinions. Because the five earlier opinions unduly restricted the
right of confrontation, repudiation in Roberts would be
preferable, as would a reversion to the basic rationales evidenced
in Pointer, Barber, Douglas, and Bruton. Moreover, many of the
appellate state courts and federal courts of appeals, having ap-
plied what they considered to be the rationales of those four
earlier decisions, discovered in the decisions from Green through
Roberts that the confrontation rights that they thought to exist
were distinguished away.5"
56. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court of Ohio read California v. Green
as requiring the conclusion that Roberts' right of confrontation had been
violated by the receipt in evidence of Anita Isaacs' preliminary hearing
testimony. State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St. 2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978). In
Parker v. Randolph, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded
that respondents' rights as defined in Bruton had been violated. Randolph v.
Parker, 575 F.2d 11178 (6th Cir. 1978). In Mancusi v. Stubbs, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that Stubbs' confrontation right had
been violated. Stubbs v. Mancusi, 442 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1971). In Nelson v.
O'Neil, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the defen-
dant's rights as set forth in Bruton had been violated. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422
F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1970). In Dutton v. Evans, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit concluded that Evans' right of confrontation had been violated.
Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968). Finally, in California v. Green,
the Supreme Court of California found that Green's confrontation right had
been violated. People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782
(1969).
Some of the post-Roberts opinions imply a certain judicial discomfiture with
the Court's having achieved a near congruency between the sixth amendment
right of confrontation and the hearsay rule and its exceptions. In United States
v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit, after citing
Roberts, wrote:
The Supreme Court has been at pains to point out that the contours of
the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are not wholly congruent.
Conceptually, at least, evidence sufficiently reliable to qualify for admis-
sion under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule might yet offend
confrontation values . ...
Nevertheless, it is in practice difficult to discern the precise line of
demarcation between the indicia of reliability that are sufficient to over-
come confrontation problems and those that are sufficient to place an
extrajudicial statement within the scope of a recognized exception to the
hearsay rule. See Ohio v. Roberts . . ..
633 F.2d at 1099. Ultimately, the court of appeals ruled that a declaration
against penal interest made by an alleged accomplice of the defendant shortly
after the accomplice was apprehended, which declaration inculpated the defen-
dant, was not sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted over a hearsay objection.
Therefore, the court was not required to resolve the confrontation issue. My
reading of the opinion suggests to me that the court's stringent application of
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In the absence of any new insight into the intention of the
Framers, and none appears in any of the opinions from Green
through Roberts, the more recent and restrictive view of the
confrontation clause is at least subject to question. While the lat-
ter cases are factually distinguishable from the earlier ones, the
distinctions are constitutionally significant only to the extent
that the Court's view of the confrontation right has shifted to a
more restrictive one. And the more restrictive view seems to
clash with a basic purpose of the confrontation clause of permit-
ting the accused to confront and cross-examine his accusers in
the presence of the fact finder which must determine his guilt or
innocence.
This does not mean one should insist on an absolute reading of
the confrontation clause, excluding all inculpating extrajudicial
declarations. As noted earlier, few constitutional guarantees are
absolutes. Moreover, given the course of recent Supreme Court
decisions, such a reading of the clause would be almost certainly
feckless.57 A better reading of the clause would be one that
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which concerns declarations against penal in-
terest, was a product of the court's tacit conclusions that (1) if the declaration
was admissible over a hearsay objection, it probably would be admissible over a
confrontation objection under Roberts, and (2) such admissibility would
frustrate the purpose of the confrontation clause. The Court wrote:
Evidence that seems likely to fall afoul of the Confrontation Clause will
most often fail to qualify for admission under any recognized hearsay ex-
ception. The result is that where the confrontation clause is implicated, it
will tend inevitably to place the threshold of admissibility under the ap-
plicable hearsay exception at a level that will pass constitutional muster ....
633 F.2d at 1100.
In United States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1980), the court wrote:
"The Supreme Court recently explained that a two-step analysis is required by
the Confrontation Clause. First, the necessity of the hearsay declarations must
be assessed; secondly, the reliability of the declarations must be examined.
Ohio v. Roberts ...... Id. at 1366. Applying those tests, the court of appeals
concluded that the defendant's confrontation right had been violated by the ad-
mission of a purported conspirator's declaration.
57. In an earlier article, I suggested that extrajudicial declarations should
be admissible over the defendant's confrontation objection only where (1) there
were no alternative means to proffer the information which would provide the
accused with an opportunity for confrontation; (2) the declaration possessed a
high degree of trustworthiness; and (3) the declaration was made ante litem
motam. Seidelson, supra note 42, at 92. The Court's decisions since then make it
rather clear that those suggestions are not likely to be deemed acceptable by
the Court. Consequently, the suggestion contained herein is considerably less
demanding: it would add to the Roberts requirements that the declaration be
nonaccusatory when made. See the text immediately following this note.
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meets its basic purpose yet still permits the admission of some
inculpating extrajudicial declarations. The fact that the clause
assures the accused the right to confront the witnesses against
him suggests that perhaps the clause should be deemed inap-
plicable to nonaccusatory, albeit ultimately inculpating, declara-
tions.
How should "nonaccusatory declarations" be defined? Probably
those declaration made ante litem motam8 could be characterized
as nonaccusatory. If, at the time the declaration was made, there
had been no criminal prosecution against, or investigation which
might focus on, the ultimate defendant, the declarant is unlikely
to have had a motive to inculpate the defendant. That would sug-
gest that the declarant was not an accuser, and it would negate a
particular motive diminishing trustworthiness.
In addition, there might be certain declarations which, though
made after the initiation of prosecution or investigation, are so
clearly nonaccusatory that they too should be deemed admissi-
ble. For example, the prosecution, desirous of avoiding an
adverse "missing witness" instruction to the jury,59 might seek to
prove the death of the missing witness by having a coroner's
report received in evidence." Even if such a report had been
prepared after the criminal investigation or prosecution had
begun, it could probably be asserted that the author of the
report was not an accuser of the ultimate defendant. Adding to
Roberts a requirement that the extrajudicial declaration offered
against the accused must have been nonaccusatory when made in
order to be admissible over a confrontation clause objection
assures that the basic purpose of the clause is fulfilled and that
the clause substantially retains its trial right characteristic
without imposing an absolute bar to hearsay declarations and
58. At a time when the declarant had no motive to distort the truth.
59. "When it would be natural under the circumstances for a party to call a
particular witness . .. and he fails to do so, tradition has allowed his adversary
to use this failure as the basis for invoking an adverse inference." C. MCCOR-
MICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 656 (2d ed. 1972).
60. Cf., Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1981), where a coroner's
report was received in evidence to explain the unavailability of a prosecution
witness. In Morrow, the court of appeals, citing Roberts, found that the receipt
in evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony of the deceased witness did
not violate defendant's confrontation right. Id. at 1233. Because the preliminary
hearing testimony was clearly accusatory, I would dissent from the court's
ultimate decision.
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without unduly frustrating a state's interests in effective law en-
forcement and the formulation of evidentiary rules.
III. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The problems with the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination begin in 1966
with Schmerber v. California."1 In Schmerber the Court held that
taking a blood sample from an unconsenting suspect and then using
an analysis of the blood sample to convict the defendant of
drunken driving does not violate the defendant's right against
self-incrimination. The Court's rationale was that the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination is applicable only to
testimonial or communicative evidence, not to real or physical
evidence.62
The conclusion in Schmerber runs counter to language used by
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Rochin v. Cali-
fornia 3 some fourteen years before Schmerber. Finding that the
forceful use of an emetic solution to secure real evidence from a
suspect and then the use of that evidence to convict the defen-
dant violates his due process" rights, Frankfurter wrote:
To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call "real evi-
dence" from verbal evidence is to ignore the reason for excluding
coerced confessions. Use of involuntary verbal confessions in
State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only be-
cause of their unreliability. . . . Coerced confessions offend the
community's sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction
the brutal conduct .... would be to afford brutality the cloak of
law .... 65
Five years later in Breithaupt v. Abram' the Court distin-
guished Rochin from Breithaupt, in part because in the latter
case the physical evidence, a blood sample, was taken from an
61. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
62. Id. at 764.
63. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
64. Rochin was decided before the Court concluded that the fourth amend-
ment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the
states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and before the Court decided that the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was applicable to the states,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Consequently, the constitutional issue rested
on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
65. 342 U.S. at 173.
66. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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unconscious suspect. Hence, no force was required. In a dissent-
ing opinion, Chief Justice Warren pronounced as unacceptable
"an analysis that would make physical resistance by a prisoner a
prerequisite to the existence of his constitutional rights." 7 The
Court's opinion in Schmerber has hastened the realization of pre-
cisely such a situation. By excluding all physical evidence from
the aegis of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination,
Schmerber left such cases for resolution under the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures,"
which, in turn, has generated a series of problems.
The fact patterns imposed on the courts for resolution under
the fourth amendment as a result of Schmerber are troubling for
several reasons. First, they require the courts to make constitu-
tional decisions based on such tenuous distinctions as whether
the force applied by agents of the state to the suspect's throat
was sufficient only to prevent him from swallowing real evi-
dence, or whether the force was sufficient to interfere with
breathing. 9 Second, such tenuous distinctions necessarily afford
law enforcement officers very little meaningful guidance, because
an officer, even cognizant of the legal niceties involved, en-
counters some practical difficulty in complying with judicial pre-
cedent. Third, as Chief Justice Warren feared, the cases result in
placing a constitutional premium on the level of resistance of-
fered by a suspect. Fourth, and perhaps most serious, such deci-
sions offer very little assurance that the physical integrity of a
suspect's body will not be significantly violated by agents of the
state.
For example, in Huguez v. United States,7" a suspect was sub-
jected to a border search by customs agents and a physician. The
search escalated from a "strip and skin search"71 to a rectal ex-
amination conducted over the objection and physical resistance
of the suspect. His physical resistance was overcome by hand-
cuffing him and then "pulling forward on the handcuffs and
67. Id. at 441 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
68. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
69. See State v. Williams, 16 Wash. App. 868, 560 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App.
1977).
70. 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968).
71. Id. at 370.
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exerting enough pressure on Hugez's head, shoulders and back
to keep him bending over forward and forcing his chest to re-
main on the table."" Using those techniques the searchers
secured four packets of heroin, which were received in evidence
at defendant's trial. His conviction was reversed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which concluded
that the search was in violation of the fourth amendment and the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. Again in People v.
Bracamonte,"3 officers, armed with a search warrant and having
cause to believe that a suspect had swallowed heroin-filled
balloons, had two nurses, under the supervision of a physician,
attempt forceful use of an emetic solution to retrieve the
evidence. The forceful method employed by the nurses was so
painful that the suspect ultimately agreed to drink the emetic.
The retrieved evidence was received against the defendant at
trial. Her conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of
California, which found that the search was in violation of the
fourth amendment.
In People v. Rodriguez4 police, armed with a search warrant
and having cause to believe that a suspect had swallowed bal-
loons containing illicit drugs, took the suspect to a hospital.
After the suspect declined to drink an emetic, a physician admin-
istered the emetic through a nasal tube. The police secured
heroin from the retrieved balloons and the defendant was charged
with possession. The defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress the
evidence was denied by the trial court, but the appellate court,
in a two-to-one decision, reversed, concluding that the use of an
emetic solution without the defendant's consent constituted an
unreasonable search and seizure.
Two police officers had cause to believe that a suspect was
carrying balloons of heroin in his mouth and intended to sell the
heroin in People v. Allen."5 The officers pointed their guns at the
suspect's head and one said, "Spit it out or I'll blow your head
off." 6 The suspect complied and was charged. His pre-trial mo-
tion to suppress the evidence, denied by the trial court, was
72. Id. at 372.
73. 15 Cal.3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1975) (en banc).
74. 71 Cal. App. 3d 547, 139 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1977).
75. 86 Cal. App. 3d 948, 150 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1979).
76. Id. at 951, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
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ordered granted by the appellate court, which concluded that the
officers' conduct constituted an unreasonable search. Even
though the defendant had sustained no physical injury, the ap-
pellate court ruled that "fear, anxiety and the real prospect that
[the defendant] would suffer physical harm or death"77 made the
search violative of the fourth amendment. In characterizing the
action of the officers, the court said, "[T]heir conduct can do no
less than encourage violent confrontations between suspects and
police."78
In State v. Williams"9 police officers, executing warrants to
search a suspect's residence and person, believed him to be at-
tempting to swallow evidence. The officers pinned the suspect to
a couch, grabbed his nose and chin, and used a spoon to extract
three balloons of heroin from his mouth. The defendant filed a
motion to suppress and the trial court, finding that the defen-
dant's breathing had been substantially impaired for thirty to
sixty seconds, granted the motion. The appellate court affirmed,
two-to-one, holding "that it is constitutionally reasonable-for the
police to 'place' their hands on a suspect's throat to prevent the
swallowing of evidence, as long as they do not 'choke' him, i.e.,
prevent him from breathing or obstructing the blood supply to
his head."8
Finally, in United States v. Crowder," the court affirmed a
defendant's convictions for second-degree murder, robbery, and
carrying a dangerous weapon. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that a trial court order requiring him to submit to the
surgical removal of a bullet from his right forearm, which bullet
was subsequently received in evidence against defendant,
violated the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures.
It seems apparent that, whatever the ultimate judicial conclu-
sion as to admissibility may be, leaving the resolution of such
cases to the fourth amendment subjects the suspect to a substan-
77. Id. at 954, 150 Cal. rptr. at 572.
78. Id.
79. 16 Wash. App. 868, 560 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App. 1977).
80. Id. at 872, 560 P.2d at 1163.
81. 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 62 (1977).
Five members of the court joined in the majority opinion; one of the five wrote
a separate concurring opinion; and four members dissented in two separate
opinions.
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tial risk of having the physical integrity of his body significantly
violated by agents of the state. That is unacceptable for it "of-
fend[sJ the community's sense of fair play and decency. '8 2 There
are two alternatives available to remedy the situation. The first
is an interpretation of the fourth amendment that prohibits any
significant violation of the physical integrity of an individual's
body. This alternative is likely to be ineffective because the
fourth amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and
seizures stimulates courts toward the conclusion that significant
violations of the physical integrity of one's body may or may not
be reasonable, depending on particular circumstances and, at
least to some extent, the predisposition of the courts. The second
alternative would circumscribe the holding in Schmerber, which
should be amended by the Court. The fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination should be deemed applicable to real or
physical evidence which is secured by a significant threat to or
actual violation of the physical integrity of a suspect's body, in-
cluding any process that penetrates the body. Only in that man-
ner can adequate assurance be provided that the physical integ-
rity of the human body will not be violated by agents of the
state for the purpose of facilitating criminal investigations and
prosecutions.
The more recent fifth amendment decisions of the Supreme
Court subject the integrity of one's intellect to the same kind of
vulnerability that Schmerber has imposed on the physical in-
tegrity of one's body. In Fisher v. United States,3 for example,
the Court held that a taxpayer's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination was not applicable to accountants' work papers
delivered to the taxpayers and given by them to counsel; the
papers were vulnerable to production pursuant to summonses
issued by the Internal Revenue Service." The Court concluded
that the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination is
violated only where an incriminating, testimonial communication
is made by a suspect as a result of compulsion directed at him.
Because the summonses were directed to their counsel rather
than the taxpayers, the Court determined that the taxpayers
were under no compulsion. Hence, the fifth amendment was
82. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
83. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
84. Id. at 404.
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deemed inapplicable." Had the papers been within the purview
of the fifth amendment when in the possession of each taxpayer,
the Court indicated that the transfer to counsel for the purpose
of receiving legal advice would have created an attorney-client
privilege assertable by the taxpayer.88 It concluded, however,
that the papers, even in the possession of the taxpayer would
not have been protected by the right against self-incrimination
because of their non-testimonial character. 7
Both of those conclusions are troubling to me. First, if the tax-
payer's papers would be immune from production while in his
possession under the taxpayer's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination, the Court says that transfer to counsel would
create an attorney-client privilege. The effect of that conclusion
is to reduce a constitutional right to an evidentiary privilege
simply because a transfer is made by the taxpayer for the pur-
pose of securing legal advice. And, presumably, the attorney-
client privilege so obtained would be subject to the exceptions
usually attached to it,88 exceptions probably not applicable to the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. That is an inap-
propriate price to impose on the client for seeking legal advice.89
The rationale offered by the Court in support of its conclusion
is that a summons served on counsel generates no compulsion
with regard to the client. The Court reasoned that because the
fifth amendment protects against only compelled self-
incrimination, the summons served on counsel fails to implicate
85. Id. at 398.
86. Id. at 404.
87. Id. at 414.
88. The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication
was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b)
in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the com-
munication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance
in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a
crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived
by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950).
89. For a discussion of how Fisher relates to the sixth amendment right to
counsel, see Seidelson, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Client's Constitu-
tional Rights, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 724 (1978).
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the client's fifth amendment right. That reasoning evidences a
painfully mechanical reading of the fifth amendment's right
against self-incrimination. Suppose, for example, that counsel
asks the client to prepare a recital of facts for counsel's con-
sideration in rendering advice. If the client responds to the re-
quest and delivers the recital, the recitation would be outside the
client's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination under
Fisher. The prosecution's ability to secure the statement from
counsel would depend solely on the applicability of the attorney-
client privilege or one of the privilege's many exceptions. Such a
result simultaneously imposes a penalty on the client for seeking
legal advice and dissuades counsel from requesting, or the client
from providing, a recitation which facilitates the giving of mean-
ingful legal advice. Ultimately, it diminishes the assurance that
the integrity of the client's intellectual product, intended to be
seen only by counsel, will not be violated, to the precise extent
that the evidentiary privilege may be less protective than the
constitutional right. Consequently, Fisher should be amended to
preserve the client's fifth amendment right even after transfer
to counsel.
The second conclusion in Fisher, that the papers, even in the
hands of the client, would not be protected by his fifth amend-
ment right, was based on the Court's decision that the accoun-
tant's work papers would be non-testimonial from the client's
perspective. That decision apparently rested on the Court's
reasoning that the papers were, from the client's perspective,
simply real or physical evidence because the accountant pre-
pared them and, therefore, the papers were without the protec-
tion of the fifth amendment. Suppose, however, that the client,
contemplating possible use of a tax avoidance measure, prepares
notes for himself to determine how much tax may be avoided
and whether it would be worthwhile to utilize the measure. Sup-
pose, too, that the client subsequently becomes a defendant in a
tax evasion prosecution. Are the client's notes prepared for
himself available to the government? Here, clearly, the notes are
potentially incriminating and, because they were prepared by
the client, clearly testimonial. The Fisher Court, however, con-
cluded that there must be compulsion as well as testimonial in-
crimination. Suppose further that the government seeks the
client's notes by means of a search warrant rather than by sum-
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mons or subpoena. Is there then compulsion sufficient to trigger
the fifth amendment?
The answer is to be found in Andresen v. Maryland.9 0 There
the Court concluded that a memorandum prepared by the
defendant-attorney and secured by officers executing a search
warrant of his office, was admissible against the defendant over
his fifth amendment objection.' Though the memo was testimonial
and incriminating, the Court concluded that its use at trial did
not violate the defendant's right against self-incrimination be-
cause it was not compelled. 2 After all, the defendant was re-
quired to do nothing; the officers executing the warrant located
the memo. Consequently, the Fisher-Andresen triple-step test for
determining whether a defendant's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination has been violated- communicative, incriminat-
ing and compelled evidence-was not satisfied. The moral of
Fisher and Andresen is a painful one. Anytime one reduces his
thought processes to a tangible form he has generated evidence
that may be used against him in a criminal prosecution, even
though he never intended anyone to see or hear that product of
his mental processes.
Often the intellect works most efficiently when its product,
however fragmentary or inconclusive, is reduced to tangible
form. That activity frequently permits one to organize thoughts,
to identify weaknesses in the thought process, to recognize
related avenues of thought or simply to retain a thought for
future consideration. Under Fisher and Andresen, however, it
also produces evidence that may subsequently be seized by
agents of the state and used against one in a criminal prosecu-
tion. This unfortunate violation of the integrity of one's intellect
penalizes the use of it. Consequently, the Court should amend
this mechanical application of the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination in such a manner as to preclude the inculpating
use of the tangible product of one's intellectual process, where
that product was not intended for third-party communication.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ultimate conclusions are that the sixth amendment right
90. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
91. Id. at 477.
92. Id. at 473.
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of confrontation should be interpreted to exclude extrajudicial
accusatory declarations, even where such declarations "fall
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or possess "par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness." In that manner, the
basic purpose of the clause, assuring the accused the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers in the presence of the
fact finder which must determine his guilt or innocence, would
be substantially preserved. Also, the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination should be deemed applicable to that
physical evidence which is secured by a significant violation of
one's physical integrity, or the threat of it, and to that communi-
cative evidence which is a product of one's intellectual process
and was not intended for third-party observation (other than by
counsel), even though the product is obtained by a search war-
rant. In that manner, both the integrity of one's body and the in-
tegrity of one's intellect may be preserved.

